Iranian saffron sits at the centre of world saffron production, yet producing most of a commodity does not guarantee that farmers capture most of its final value. The 2020 report behind this article argued that bulk exports, weak origin visibility and uneven processing allowed more value to be created after saffron left Iran.

Iranian saffron threads prepared for testing packaging and world trade

That report also presented a proposed World Saffron Production and Export Organization, abbreviated OSEC. Its targets were ambitious. They should be read as a designer’s plan from that period, not as proof that an intergovernmental commodity body was formally established or achieved those targets.

Iran’s place in world saffron

The original article used estimates of more than 90% and, elsewhere, about 95% for Iran’s share of world production. A 2025 statement from the Food and Agriculture Organization likewise says Iran produces more than 90% of global saffron. The percentage varies by year and dataset, so it is better understood as evidence of a dominant production role than as a fixed number.

The earlier claim that only around 5% of value added stayed with Iran and its farmers was an advocacy estimate in the source; it was not accompanied by a calculation. The underlying problem is credible even without repeating that number as settled fact. Saffron sold in bulk may be graded, tested, packaged, branded and retailed elsewhere, leaving the producer with only the raw-material margin.

Why production volume and export value diverge

Export weight can remain steady while its dollar or rial value changes because prices, exchange rates, quality mix and destination markets change. Comparing only tonnes or only revenue therefore gives an incomplete picture.

Farm-level value also depends on matters that happen well before export:

  • clean harvesting and rapid separation of stigmas;
  • controlled drying that protects colour, aroma and flavour;
  • lot identification and records from grower to buyer;
  • credible laboratory testing and grade declarations;
  • food-safe storage and packaging;
  • contracts that define quality, price and payment clearly;
  • a visible origin and brand at the point of retail sale.

Packaging alone cannot solve a weak value chain. A fine box without traceability or consistent quality may raise costs while doing little for trust.

What the proposed OSEC was meant to do

The article identified Mostafavi as the designer of the World Saffron Production and Export Organization. He described a secretariat that would bring together government representatives, the Ministries of Agricultural Jihad and Foreign Affairs, farmers and exporters.

He also referred to 11 participating countries and a three-stage programme:

  • Short term, one to three years: research and consolidation.
  • Medium term, three to six years: promotion and influence.
  • Long term: growth and productivity.

The report said researchers and professors had worked intensively on the plan for eight months, but its translated figures—“10 hours a day” followed by “30 hours of study daily”—are internally inconsistent. They are not reliable measures of the work and should not be used to establish credibility.

The proposed international goals

Mostafavi said the OSEC design contained 17 major goals, 14 international special goals and 17 strategies. The list covered price stability, reliable income for producing countries, efficient supply to consuming countries, permanent and new markets, safer investment, credit, insurance and wider use of saffron products.

Other proposed activities included:

  • reducing fraud, smuggling and profiteering;
  • creating a global saffron exchange and financial reserve;
  • building banks of saffron material, experience and market knowledge;
  • aligning standards and monitoring policies;
  • studying consumer needs;
  • appointing saffron advisers or ambassadors in participating countries;
  • forming national saffron companies and a value-chain innovation centre;
  • training farmers and identifying products and producers;
  • promoting fair trade and proposing a World Saffron Day.

The plan also mentioned cultivation restrictions in some countries. Any such policy would require public authority, transparent evidence and lawful international cooperation; it is not something a private proposal could impose.

What can be verified today

Independent official evidence supports the need for quality and authenticity work, but not every institutional claim in the 2020 article. FAO’s current programme with Iranian partners focuses on laboratory verification, post-harvest guidance and a more transparent saffron value chain. Those are concrete foundations for consumer trust.

International standardisation has also progressed through Codex. The Codex saffron project document frames safety, quality, hygiene and labelling as matters for an internationally agreed commodity standard. That kind of published, multi-country standards process is different from announcing an organisation or a list of goals.

A stronger route to value for farmers and traders

The useful part of the OSEC idea is coordination. Farmers cannot carry the burden alone, and traders cannot build a durable market around inconsistent lots. A practical programme would publish its membership, legal status, governance, financing and results, then measure whether producers actually receive a larger and more stable share.

Progress can be tracked through ordinary evidence: the proportion of lots with farm-level traceability, test pass rates, rejection and adulteration rates, price differences by verified grade, payment time to farmers, the share exported in origin-visible packages and the number of repeat buyers.

World saffron trade does not need inflated claims about ownership of a crop. It needs trustworthy origin information, comparable quality, fair contracts and products that arrive as promised. Iran’s production scale gives it a powerful starting point; disciplined value-chain work determines how much of that strength reaches growers.